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A new formulation is given for the well-known problem of investment allocetion between 
regions in the framework of a planning model. The c~se of a dual economy with a Cobb- 
Douglas production function i~ worked out in detail with an illustrative numerical example. The 
corresponding problem for an industrial economy with income disparity between two regions is 
also discussed. 
1. Introduction 
The problem of investment allocation between regions has been studied in 
the sixties using the techniques of modern control theory [e.g., Rahman 
(1963), Intriligator (1964), Takayama (1974)]. All these studies used constant 
capital-output ratio for the production function and a finite horizon 
optimization problem. Pitchford (1977) discussed extension to general 
production function and infinite planning horizon. The solutions discussed in 
Takayama (1974) under various criteria functionals were 'bang-bang' in 
character, with the possibility of one switch. This strategy is somewhat 
academic, r-articularly in the context of planning in an underdeveloped 
country where d',lal economy prevails. If the purpose of the central planning 
board is to maximize the percapita consumption over the whole planning 
period, it may quite well be optimal to invest all the savings in the advanced 
sector of the economy. The recent debate on development planning 
convincingly shows the fallacy of such a policy. The work of Todaro (1969) 
is particularly illustrative in this context. Myrdal (1968) and Singer (1975) 
advocated ifferent ype of criteria which would reflect some kind of transfer 
of actual consumption from the advanced to the traditional sector of the 
economy. The transfer of too much of the development fund to the 
traditional sector is, however, not politically possible when one realizes that 
most of this capital comes out of the savings incurred in the advanced sector 
of the economy. To introduce this aspect o the problem, we do not consider 
the savings rate of the advanced sector fixed, as assumed in Takayama 
(1974). We reforrr.,ulate the problem where the advanced region has the 
flexibility to choose its savings strategy once it knows the allocation decision 
0166-0462/81/0000- 00/$02.50 © North-Holland Publishing Company 
206 A, Bagchi et al., Regional allocation of investment 
of the central planning board. This leads to a hierarchical optimization 
problem. We consider a short-term (finite horizon) planning problem and ask 
the question as to what is the optimum proportion of savings that should be 
allocated to the two regions to achieve a socially desirable goal. For 
simplicity and also because abrupt change of this proportion of savings to be 
allocated to the regions are difficult to implement, we consider this quantity 
to be constant hroughout the planning period, In the terminology of the 
hierarchical control theory, we have a Stackelberg problem where the central 
planning board is the leader and the agency regulating savings decision of 
the advanced sector is the follower. This is analyzed in the framework of 
standard dynamical game theory. The basic concepts and methods of 
handling such problems may be found in Simaan and Cruz (1973). Firially, 
an extension of this problem is formulated where both the regions have 
savings policies. This would correspond to the situation of an industrial 
economy with income gaps between the regions. 
2. Regional allocation problem 
We denote the advanced sector by suffix 1 and the traditional sector by 
suffix 2. 
K~ denotes the capital, L~ the working population and Y~ the output of the 
region i, i= 1, 2. All these are, of course, time functions. Assuming F~ to be 
the production function in the region i, 
Yi=FI(K~,Lj), i= 1,2. (1) 
We consider the rate of growth of working population in each region as 
exogenously determined and is a constant n. The case of different rates of 
growth of working population poses no technical difficulty. Thus 
Li = nLi, n constant, 
Li(0)= Lio given i = 1,2. (2) 
We denote the percapita quantities by the corresponding small letter and 
denote F~(ki, 1 ) by f~(k~), i= 1,2. Let cl be the fraction of the percapita output 
of the region 1 used for percapita consumption i  that region, and assume 
that region 2 consumes all it produces. Let ~ be the proportion of savings of 
the region 1 (aad therefore, of the economy as a whole) that is reinvested in 
the same region, the rest being allocated to the region 2. The system 
A. Bagchi et al., Regional allocation of investment 207 
dynamics is then given by 
[q = flf l (kl ) (1 -c t  ) -  nkl, O<c~<l (3) 
kt (0)= klo, given, 
~2 = (l - flff'~ (k~ )(1-c~ )-L~O- nk2, (4) 
k2(0) = k2o, given. 
Given fl, the policy-making agency in region 1 chooses cl so as to maximize 
the criterion 
| T 
= ~. {ct f~(kt ( t ) )}~-"dt+b,k , (T) ,  J' i 'v! v a constant, 
where the weighting factor bl is chosen close to the price of capital at the 
golden rule path. Discussions on this and other types of criterion can be 
found in Chakravarty (1969). We use the present criterion for simplicity. The 
main objective is to reflect the natural behavioural pattern that as fl 
decreases from 1, region 1 will have less incentive to save, as the savings will 
then b,~ mostly appropriated to the other region. On the other hand, with fl 
getting v,-ry close to zero, overconsumption will drastically reduce the capital 
of region 1 :~nd it will have a natural tendency to give more and more weight 
to its final capital. Thus, with very small fl, consumption of the region 1 will 
be rather low throughout the planning period. These are discussed again in 
connection with a numerical example. 
We now discuss the policy issue confronting the central planning board. It 
wants to choose fl so that the overall satisfaction of both the regions is 
maximized. If the planning board chooses an average of the percapita 
consumption of the two regions as its criterion, one might obtain a 
maximum with large disparity in the consumption pattern between the two 
regions. One possible criterion which is less defective from the standpoint of 
this article is the product of the percapita consumption of the two regions. 
Thus, the criterion to be maximized at the higher level, assuming that region 
2 consumes all it produces, is taken to be 
- - -e_  - -  
1 T 
(l--v) 2 ! {c'f~(k')f2(k2))t-~dt" 
We, therefore, have a two-levd optimization problem. Given fl, we have to 
determine c t at the lower level that maximizes J l. This optimal c l, denoted 
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c~', will naturally depend on /~. Using this c*, we have to determine that # 
which maximizes ,,¢. 
3. Method ot' solution 
We first solve the optimization problem at the lower level. Thus, assume 
that fl is given. The state equation is 
[~ l=f l f l (k l ) ( l - c t ) -nk l ,  0=<cl<l, (5) 
k t(0)=klo, given. 
The criterion to be maximized is 
| T 
- {c l f~'kt ( t ) )} l - "dt+blk l (T) .  (6) 
J '  I - v !  
We assume Cobb--Douglas production function: 
f/= A,~'. 
We use the minimum principle of Pontryagin to obtain a necessary condition 
for optimum. The Hamiltonian for the problem is 
l - v  
{ctA, ~'  } ~-~ +ptflEAl ~'  (1 -c  t ) ] -  ptnk t 
where the costate p~ satisfies 
Pl = 0tl (ClA 1 )1-,k~,(l -,.)- t +Pl {n--otlflA t~ ' -  1( 1 -c t  )}, 
pI(T)= -b l .  (7) 
The c l dependent part of H is 
1 
Hi = --~1 -v  {ctAtk~t' } l-~-PtflAtk~tct" 
If Pl >0. H! is monotonically decreasing as cl increases from 0, while if Pl 
<0. H~ has a unique minimum for cl >0. Thus, the optimal c~'=0 in any 
subinterval is ruled out. The control cl is constrained to be in 0<cl  < 1. 
Since H~ monotonically decreases as cl increases when Pl >0, it follows that 
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H1 will be minimum in that case if c"{= 1. For Pl <0, H1 has a unique 
minimum for 
cl =( -p lpA I~")  - t / ' .  
If the right-hand side is less than 1, then it gives the optimal cl', while if it is 
greater than or equal to 1, the optimal c* = 1 again. Combining all these 
cases, we see that the optimal 
c'~ =sat[(-plpA] ~'~)- 1/,,], (8) 
where 
sat(x)=x if O<x<l ,  
= 1 if otherwise. 
We have yet to specify bt. For this, we consider the steady-state values of k, 
and Pl, denoted kl,t and Plst, respectively. The corresponding c~' we denote 
by ct*st. The state and costate quations in steady state become 
~A1/d' 1,,(1 - c"[,, ) - nk ls, =0, 
~lst +Ptst{n-° t l f lA l  k ~'' l ,,, 
b air - l /v]. * =sat[(-p~,,pA~,,,,, ) List 
The solution of this set of equations i  
k t., = (a ,pA  1/")1/1 - =,, 
pl~, = _#-1  +,,(~Alk~ _nklst ) -~.  
(9) 
We take bl =-P~st .  
We have to solve a two-point boundary value problem to determine c*. 
Note that the boundary condition for Pt depends on p. Thus, the decision of 
the regulating agency of the region 1 regarding the weight bl in its criterion 
functional depends upon the p chosen by the central planning board. For a 
given fl, we have obtained the optimal c~' and the corresponding k*. To 
perform optimization at the higher level, we have to know the capital 
accumulation of the region 2. This is given by 
L ie  
t k~ '=' (I - c* ) -  . k2 ,  k2(0)=k2o, given. (!0~ 
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Let kS denote the solution of this equation. We are, then, left with the simple 
optimization of finding fl that maximizes 
J ~ 
1 T 
! .~,.,a t,*"l A 2 k~ "1 } t - , .  dt. 
( l - v )  2 t~ l~ l " t  
4. Numerical results 
The optimization for /~ is performed using simple search technique. For 
numerical experiments, we must specify all the numerical values of the 
parameters and prescribe the necessary initial conditions. We use data in 
comparable unit as used by Das (1974) who studied an elaborate optimal 
investment planning problem in the framework of the Feldman-Mahalanobis 
model. Our results are illustrative rather than prescriptive. Although the 
units correspond to a planning problem relevant e the economy of India, 
the values chosen for the initial conditions are somewhat arbitrary: 
L io  = 
L2o = 
r l  - -  
T = 
iv --- 
~1 --" 
~2 - -  
k lo  - -  
/ (20  - -  
10 {number of workers in millions), 
100 tnumber of workers in millions), 
0.0488, 
10 {number of years), 
0.6, 
0.6, AI =0.32, 
0.4. Az =0.149, 
0.1 (in rupees 10,000), 
0.002, 
0.007 lin rupees 10,000), 
O.02. 
The table below shows the dependence of b~ on fl 
/S]l.O 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
t 
b,.]i (M~ !..,_"'~ 1.53 1.97 2.64 3.73 5.71 9.86 21.3 79.5 
We see that bl increases teadily with decreasing fl and increases drastically 
towards the end when fl becomes 0.2 and gets smaller. With very small fl, 
region 1 virtually tries to maximize only its final capital as, otherwise, it 
would be left with too little capital at the end of the planning period. 
The following graph gives the functional relation of j with fl 
corresponding to the case when !-'2o =0.002, 0.007 and 0.02. With fixed initial 
capital of the advanced set tor, we see that the optimal fl is steadily higher 
with the steadily increasing initial capital of the traditional sector. This is not 
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surprising as lesser capital transfer is expected when the traditional sector is 
not too  worse off in relation to the advanced sector. 
The drastic fall of j after p d~reases to 0.2 and less is explained by the 
fact that for p in the range, b, is drastically high so that the consumption is 
very low in the region 1. On the other hand, if the regulating agency of 
region 1 takes b, to be constant corresponding to/ /= 1, the consumption of 
region 1 will be large throughout the planning period and J will be flat for 
//smaller than 0.2. 
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Fig. 1. Dependence of J on p. 
5. Generalization of the model 
The situation is somewhat different when one considers the investment 
allocation problem in an industrialized country with income disparity 
between two regions. The assumption that region 2 consumes all it produces 
is not realistic anymore. We, therefore, extend our model to the situation 
when both the regions ave using their own criterion. Thus in the lower level, 
we have the following problem: 
L2o  _ 
~, -- Pfl (k l ) ( l  --¢1 )+ (l -- 7) 7-- -  J2 (k2)(l - c2) -nk l '  
212 A. Bagchi et ai., Regional allocation of investment 
Llo 
~2- (1 - fl) L20 ft (kt)(1 -cx )+ "y f2 (k2)(1 - c2) -  nk 2,, 
k2(0)--=k2o, 0<ci-<l, i=1,2. 
Reg-on i wants to maximize 
| T 
/ ' -  1 --v ! {cifi(k'(t))} l-" dt +biki(T ), 
where b~ is the price of capital of region i on the golden rule path. The 
central planning authority, which works as a higher level decision maker, 
chooses fl and 7- For fixed fl and 3', we have, thus, a non-zero sum differential 
game problem at the lower level. Solution concepts, therefore, become 
crucial. The two regions, for example, may decide to play Nash or, to play 
Pareto. in the latter situation, the problem reduces to determining cl and c2 
so as to maximize 
for some ~., 0<~<1.  in the former case, the problem is even more 
complicated. This is the situation of interregional conflict. First, it must be 
decided to which class cl and c2 belong (e.g., open or closed loop class). In 
principle, one has to solve for optimal cl given a fixed c2 and then solve for 
optimal c, given a fixed c l. The resulting pair of functional equations will 
determine the optimal strategies c~' and c~. The optimization problem at the 
higher level remaim the same as before. Solution patterns for this problem 
are being investigate~d by the authors at present. 
6. Conclusion 
We posed the investment allocation problem between two regions in a new 
way. which resulted in a Stackelberg-type hierarchical optimization problem. 
The idea was to shed some light in the current debate in developing 
countries with dual economy about the transfer of investment capital from 
the advanced to the traditional sector of the economy. Generalization of the 
model to an industrialized country with income disparity between two 
regions has also been mentioned, although the actual solution was not 
worked out. 
An obvious extension of the present work is to consider time-varying fl
and pose the higher level optimization also as a control problem. This could 
be fdrmulaled both as open-or closed-loop problem. This is considerably 
more complicated. For long-term ~ planning problem, one is compelled to 
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consider this situation. On the other hand. the assumption of total 
consumption of the output of the traditional sector becomes dubious if the 
planning horizon is very large. 
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